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Introduction and summary
On November 2, 2004, voters in Michigan approved a state constitutional amendment 
that prohibited same-sex marriage. The amendment, known as Proposal 2, passed with 
nearly 60- percent support and came after vigorous efforts by advocacy groups and faith 
communities on both sides of the issue. 
Supporters of Proposal 2 raised more money and waged a stronger campaign than their 
opponents. Proposal 2 supporters also relied heavily on religious arguments, while their 
opponents tended to frame their arguments mainly in secular terms, such as issues of civil 
rights and social justice. Supporters also launched a late barrage of spending, mailings, and 
sermons. Their efforts were successful, and the proposal passed. Exit polls showed that 
religion played a significant role in the outcome. 
Since 2004, there have been several consequences to passage of Proposal 2. One has been 
the denial of health care benefits to same-sex partners in civil unions. Although Proposal 2 
supporters claimed the proposal was limited to marriage and would not take away health 
benefits, in fact it did. 
A review of the battle over Proposal 2, the alliances it shaped, and the efforts and tactics 
involved not only provides insights into the ballot-initiative process, but, more impor-
tantly, may help illuminate similar campaigns in the future. The arguments, organizing 
strategies, and communications messages that worked, or didn’t work, for Proposal 2 in 
Michigan can serve as lessons in future struggles. This paper will explore those strategies 
so that progressives in Michigan and other states can learn from the experiences in this 
battleground over marriage equality.
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Background
Prior to Proposal 2, Michigan state law contained two prohibitions of same-sex marriage: 
Public Acts 324 and 334 of 1996. Respectively, they said that marriage between two indi-
viduals of the same sex is not valid, and that marriages between individuals of the same 
sex performed in other states will not be recognized. In addition, the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act, also passed in 1996, placed similar restrictions on the recognition of same-
sex marriage.1 
Despite these laws, conservative officials and activists within Michigan decided in 2003 
to seek to codify the ban on same-sex marriage in the state’s constitution. The move came 
as a number of judicial and executive decisions elsewhere in the country kept the issue 
of gay rights and, more specifically, same-sex marriage bubbling in the American politi-
cal agenda. They included the U.S. Supreme Court striking down anti-sodomy laws, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturning that state’s gay marriage ban, and the 
mayor of San Francisco issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
The 2004 presidential election also played a role. Political analysts argued that same-sex 
marriage-ban ballot proposals would ensure a higher conservative voter turnout, which 
would aid former President George W. Bush in his reelection bid. Consequently, Bush 
supporters sought to get such initiatives on November ballots wherever possible. Many 
analysts saw Michigan’s Proposal 2 as a reaction to these political forces.
Getting Proposal 2 on the ballot
Efforts to enact a constitutional ban against same-sex marriage in Michigan began in the 
state legislature. Republican legislators introduced amendments in both chambers to 
prohibit recognizing same-sex marriages or any similar unions, but could not gain the 
two-thirds support required to present the amendments to voters. Responding to failure 
in the legislature, supporters of the ban turned to collecting signatures to put the proposal 
directly to voters.2
By now, it was late spring 2004. The deadline for collecting signatures was July 5. The 
measure required 317,757 signatures for certification by the Board of State Canvassers for 
a place on the November ballot. 3 
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Two ballot committees formed early in the campaign and dominated the signature drive 
process. They were Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, or CPM, which had strong 
financial support from the state’s seven Catholic dioceses, and the Coalition for a Fair 
Michigan, which relied on supporters of lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender rights, 
among others.4 CPM supported Proposal 2; CFM opposed it. 
In addition, the state’s faith communities also mobilized around Proposal 2. Although 
most faith communities supported Proposal 2, there was also opposition, sometimes 
within the same faith traditions, which led to conflicting views. In the end, CPM collected 
more than 500,000 signatures in a notably short amount of time, and the proposal was 
certified for the November ballot.5
Proposal language
The official language of the ballot read: “The proposal would amend the state constitution 
to provide that ‘the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agree-
ment recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.’” 6 
The wording served as a major source of controversy. Opponents argued that the broad-
ness and ambiguity of the language would do more than ban same-sex marriage, and 
would also result in the denial of benefits for domestic partnerships. Proponents disputed 
this argument and regularly claimed that the proposal was only about defining marriage, 
not benefits for civil unions.
Election results
On Election Day, voters overwhelmingly adopted Proposal 2: 58.6 percent (2,698,077) 
to 41.4 percent (1,904,319). 7 Exit polling by CNN showed that more than 60 percent of 
both Protestant and Catholic respondents voted in favor of the amendment. 
Those of other faiths and those claiming no religion registered support in the mid-30 per-
cent range. Support among Jewish voters was much lower, at 14 percent. CNN also found 
that 82 percent of those who attend church more than weekly voted yes, while 58 percent 
of monthly churchgoers and 35 percent of nonchurch attendees favored Proposal 2.8
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Motivating constituencies
Individuals on both sides of Proposal 2 created ballot committees on the initiative. In total, 
Michiganders formed eight ballot committees—seven in support of Proposal 2 and one 
in opposition. The two principle committees were Citizens for the Protection of Marriage 
and the Coalition for a Fair Michigan. Between them, they accounted for nearly 90 per-
cent of the $2,784,643 raised in the campaign.9 
The eight ballot committees were not alone, however, in their efforts on Proposal 2. 
Indeed, the faithful throughout the state made significant efforts through their various 
faith traditions in supporting and opposing the initiative. No side of the debate received 
the unanimous support of any faith community. Even within faith traditions, unanimity of 
opinion did not exist.
Citizens for the Protection of Marriage
Citizens for the Protection of Marriage was the dominant ballot committee in support 
of Proposal 2.10 Formed originally to collect signatures to get the proposal on the ballot, 
it transitioned quickly into the election. Prominent members of Michigan’s Citizens for 
Traditional Values, a conservative, family-oriented organization, and other conservative 
Michigan residents formed CPM.11 
CPM’s funding contributed greatly to its strength. It raised $1,626,582, including more 
than $1 million from the state’s seven Catholic dioceses. Other donors included the 
Family Research Council, Focus on the Family, and the Michigan Family Forum.12 By the 
third week of October, CPM claimed strong grassroots support, citing more than 400 
individual donors.13 Of these individual donations, the most significant contribution came 
from Elsa Prince Broekhuizen, whose family has extensive ties with Michigan’s Republican 
Party, and the Family Research Council.14 
Of the money raised, CPM spent an overwhelming portion on the Sterling Corporation, 
a Lansing consulting firm with mainly Republican clients.15 Sterling Corp.’s website 
describes it as a “firm specializing in ballot campaign management.”16 CPM also paid 
$110,000 to Public Opinion Strategies, a national Republican polling firm based in 
Alexandria, Virginia.17 
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The high level of organization that characterized CPM in the signature drive continued 
during the general campaign. CPM also maintained noticeable visibility in both local 
and national coverage. Local coordinators from the signature drive worked in all 83 of 
Michigan’s counties. CPM maintained a website that distributed information to support-
ers and allowed for online donations. Early in the campaign, it focused on voter registra-
tion before turning to a public education and awareness effort.18 CPM also funded a 
statewide radio and television campaign in major metropolitan areas of Michigan.19
Throughout the campaign, CPM presented its argument carefully. It avoided explicit 
anti-gay rhetoric. Rather, it branded Proposal 2 as pro-family and pro-marriage, referring 
regularly to families and “man and wife.”20 In its ads and interviews, CPM responded to 
criticism of the amendment’s broad language, offering assurance that the amendment 
was only about marriage and would not remove benefits. Throughout the campaign and 
especially towards the end, their opponent’s arguments forced CPM to regularly address 
the scope and intentions of the amendment.21
CPM’s television ads spoke directly to the question of eliminating benefits for civil unions: 
Proposal 2 isn’t about benefits; it just puts the definition of marriage in our constitution. 
Judges and politicians couldn’t change it; only voters could… One man, one woman. 
Vote yes, Proposal 2.22 
CPM also often cited the risk of “activist judges” overturning the state’s current ban on 
same-sex marriage. 
While CPM did not have an outright religious component, religion and religious indi-
viduals played a significant role in its activities. The Catholic Church contributed signifi-
cant financial support. CPM’s chairwoman, Marlene Elwell, had significant ties within 
Michigan’s religious communities. 23 A devout Catholic, she founded Catholics in the 
Public Square, which was created in 2003 as a group of lay Catholics whose objective is 
“to equip Catholics in responding to the issues of the day, thereby having an impact on the 
culture rather than having the culture impact us as Catholics.” 24 Elwell’s biography on the 
CPS’s website addresses the faithful’s involvement in Proposal 2: 
The bedrock of this effort was Christian citizens. They were heard in America’s demo-
cratic process. And now marriage, biblically defined, has been secured for the generations 
behind us. Together we created a legacy to leave for our children.25 
CPM also specifically targeted religious communities in its efforts. During the signature 
drive, for instance, CPM volunteers collected signatures before and after church services 
outside numerous places of worship.26 CPM also distributed 1 million flyers in support of 
Proposal 2 at Protestant churches throughout Michigan.27
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Coalition for a Fair Michigan
The Coalition for a Fair Michigan was the only ballot committee that opposed Proposal 2. 
CFM also formed early in the campaign and worked during the signature drive, and then 
transitioned into the November election.28 Raising more than $854,200,29 CFM claimed 
over 1,200 financial supporters,30 but many of these donations were not itemized. 
Further, CFM filed neither detailed information about contributors, nor required periodic 
reports. Of donations that were itemized, individuals and organizations supporting lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender rights made up the largest segment, with significant support 
from the Human Rights Campaign, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and the 
Triangle Foundation.31 Of its total funds, CFM spent over $600,000 on TV spots. In attempt-
ing to run a lean campaign, the group focused on television ads, rather than radio spots and 
direct mail. Throughout the campaign, its primary concern was message delivery.32
CFM maintained a website, using it to distribute information and raise funds.33 It cre-
ated a Yahoo Group that served as an outreach and announcement tool and included 
more than 120 members.34 The organization made efforts to reach out to editorial 
boards and received mostly positive coverage in local and national media. CFM also col-
laborated with a religious group, the Religious Coalition for a Fair Michigan,35 to reach 
out to faith communities. In post-election coverage of the campaign, analysts described 
CFM as a “short-lived political committee formed with one specific purpose.”36 While it 
made great efforts towards marriage equality, the coalition was formed around a specific 
campaign, as opposed to LGBT groups in Michigan that were more movement-focused 
and had been in existence longer. 
In arguing for Proposal 2’s defeat, CFM largely focused on the proposal’s overly broad 
language, which threatened to remove existing benefits from same-sex domestic partners, 
including taking away health insurance from children in those families. This message was 
more dominant than a broadly aimed moral message about Proposal 2. CFM also regu-
larly emphasized that three laws had already banned gay marriage in Michigan, and so the 
Proposal was unnecessary. The goal of the coalition was specific and targeted—getting vot-
ers to reject Proposal 2—rather than a more ambitious goal to change hearts and minds 
on the issue of marriage equality.37
CFM was a secular organization, but it did work with and reach out to numerous faith 
communities. The group organized four press conferences throughout Michigan at which 
numerous religious leaders opposed the ballot initiative.38 Similarly, CFM worked to 
establish relationships with faith leaders, such as Rev. Wendell Anthony, pastor of one of 
Detroit’s largest United Church of Christ churches and president of the Detroit Branch of 
the NAACP, to garner opposition to and soften support of Proposal 2.39
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The Catholic Church
Of all the faith traditions, the Catholic Church was the dominant player in the cam-
paign. The state’s seven dioceses were the major financial contributors to Citizens for the 
Protection of Marriage. 
Furthermore, the Church’s leadership and its public policy arm worked diligently for 
passage of Proposal 2. Despite this official stance, however, even certain Catholic groups, 
Catholic clergy, and individual Catholic parishioners opposed Proposal 2. 
Support
The Michigan Catholic Conference, the public policy arm of the state’s seven dioceses, 
coordinated the official efforts made by the Catholic Church in support of Proposal 2.40 
At the time of the November 2004 election, the MCC was chaired by Cardinal Adam 
Maida.41 It employed a number of tools in the campaign, including the pulpit, publica-
tions, and mailings.
Cardinal Maida and the MCC worked to reach Catholic voters directly, distributing an 
eight-minute video to all Catholic parishes that urged a “Yes” on Proposal 2.42 “From 
the beginning of human memory, marriage has always been understood as the union of 
one man and one woman,” Cardinal Maida said on the video. “Let us do our part here in 
Michigan to preserve that sacred understanding and definition of marriage.”43 
Church officials strongly encouraged showing the video during services. Accompanying 
the video were additional materials that suggested talking points for homilies and answers 
to frequently asked questions.44 In addition, FOCUS, a publication of the MCC, dedicated 
the three issues leading to the November election at least in part to the issue of same-sex 
marriage and passing Proposal 2.45 The Church also sent a mailing on Proposal 2, entitled 
“Between One Man and One Woman,” to all 596,000 registered Catholic households in the 
state. 46 The mailing went out on October 15, just two weeks before the election.47
Similarly to CPM, the Catholic Church presented its Proposal 2 arguments in a pro-family 
and a pro-marriage light, versus an anti-gay one. Both Cardinal Maida’s video and the lan-
guage in FOCUS evoked what the Church considered to be the traditional image of marriage.
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The Church regularly cited “the common good” in its arguments, going so far as to say 
that a “redefinition of marriage must be seen as an attack on the common good” and that 
the Church cannot “be intimidated by those who see our defense of the common good as 
simply mean-spirited, narrow-minded, or intolerant of other people’s supposed rights.”48 The 
Church also cited the risk of “activist judges” overturning current laws in their arguments.49 
In disseminating these arguments and materials, the Church had the notable advantage of 
preexisting avenues, institutions, and frameworks through which it could reach parishio-
ners and voters. Few other actors in the campaign had such an advantage.
Opposition
The MCC and Cardinal Maida were not the sole Catholic voices speaking on Proposal 2. 
While opposing voices may not have had the strength and organization of the MCC, they 
voiced their views. On October 24, for example, just a week after the MCC’s “Between 
One Man and One Woman” mailing, 80 Michigan Catholics, including 20 Catholic priests, 
released a signed statement opposing Proposal 2. The statement said the signers “must 
respectfully dissociate ourselves from the [Catholic conference’s] advocacy of Proposal 2” 
and that the wording of the amendment “appears to create serious and undue hardship for 
a whole class of citizens, and thus violate Catholic social teaching.”50
Notably among the signers was the auxiliary bishop for the Archdiocese of Detroit, 
Bishop Thomas Gumbleton. A familiar progressive faith voice in Michigan, Bishop 
Gumbleton not only signed the letter, but he also gave public interviews in which he 
voiced his opposition. 
“In my own opinion, I think it’s an overreaction to the issue,” he said in an interview with 
Between the Lines, a Michigan-based LGBT publication. “The text as I’ve seen it is too 
open-ended, and people who are living as partners would be denied medical benefits, the 
right to enter the room if someone’s dying, that sort of thing. I think it’s a cruel overreac-
tion against homosexual people, and I think it’s unnecessary.” 51
Other Catholic opposition to Proposal 2 came from Catholics for the Common Good. 
CCG, for example, staged a protest in response to an organized prayer meeting at which 
some Catholics gathered to pray that Michigan voters would uphold heterosexual 
marriage. At the protest, Anthony Kosnik, a CCG member, life-long Catholic, and a 
professor of Christian ethics, told the Washington Post, “My God is a God of love and 
compassion…Jesus said nothing about homosexuality at all, but he did talk a lot about 
love of neighbor.”52
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Other faith traditions 
and organizations
In addition to Catholics, a range of other faith traditions was also drawn into the 
debate over Proposal 2. Among them were African-American clergy and congregations, 
Evangelicals, Episcopalians, the United Church of Christ, and groups such as the Religious 
Coalition for a Fair Michigan and Concerned Clergy.
Support
African-American clergy and congregations found themselves at a strange crossroads over 
Proposal 2. An article in the Detroit Free Press explained: “Detroit’s influential black pas-
tors, historically liberal and Democratic voters on social justice issues, want Proposal 2 to 
pass, reflecting the African-American community’s traditional values about marriage. They 
find themselves in unique agreement with the conservative, Republican-oriented Michigan 
Family Forum and Family Research Council.”53 The Council of Black Pastors in Detroit 
and Vicinity voted in strong support for Proposal 2. Similarly, Rev. Levon Yuille, head of the 
National Pro-Life Black Caucus, endorsed Proposal 2 and worked to collect signatures. 54
In mid-October, more than 300 pastors from the Detroit metropolitan area gathered to sign 
an “Open Letter to the Citizens of Michigan” that declared marriage as the union of one man 
and one woman. At the signing ceremony, a number voiced their reasoning. Marriage “is 
the foundation of our families, and ultimately the foundation of our society,” they said. The 
“word of God is clear about the sanctity and unique union between a man and his wife.”55
Evangelicals heading independent fundamentalist congregations also provided significant 
support for Proposal 2. Conservative evangelicals from Western Michigan were major finan-
cial supporters, for example.56 Similarly, mega churches that were in support of Proposal 2 
were very effective in disseminating information and campaigning for its passage. 57
Opposition
A group called The Religious Coalition for a Fair Michigan, which described itself on 
its website as a group of “people of faith working to defeat the Michigan Marriage 
Amendment,” actively worked on the campaign.58 Organized by Michael Gibson-Faith of 
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the Quaker organization The American Friends Service Committee, RCFM worked to 
highlight religious opposition to Proposal 2. 
The group used language that focused on the banning of same-sex marriage as a moral 
and social justice issue, especially to persuade progressive congregations and those in 
the ‘moveable middle.’59 For instance, campaign materials read: “This amendment would 
intentionally cause harm to thousands of Michigan families and would eliminate existing 
rights and laws in Michigan that help strengthen families.”60 
More than 30 congregations and religious groups and more than 100 individual clergy mem-
bers were among RCFM’s ranks.61 These members included individuals not typically found 
advocating for LGBT rights or speaking out on political matters.62 Other RCFM efforts, while 
their extent and success were unverified, included distributing bulletin inserts, organizing 
a sermon blitz during September and October, organizing candlelight vigils, and raising funds.63
The Concerned Clergy of Western Michigan, a coalition of ministers that works toward 
openness and acceptance of gays and lesbians in churches, was active in the battle over 
Proposal 2 as well. The group ran ads and billboards that called Proposal 2 “unequal, unfair, 
and unjust.”64 Concerned Clergy actively engaged the supporters of Proposal 2. They orga-
nized a debate with Proposal 2 supporter and co-author Gary Glenn and participated in a 
media debate with former Republican State Representative Harold Voorhees, a supporter 
of Proposal 2 and founding member of Citizens for the Protection of Marriage. 
Concerned Clergy also targeted swayable churchgoers who were under the assumption 
that the Bible and their church were unanimously opposed to marriage equality. In its 
message, Concerned Clergy focused on Proposal 2’s unfairness and the risk of children 
losing health insurance coverage through the revocation of domestic partner benefits.65
In all, estimates by the media registered more than 300 clergy members and congregations 
statewide in opposition to Proposal 2.66 These groups and organizations often cited the 
language of the amendment and its uncertain impacts as the reasons for their opposition. 
The state’s four Episcopalian Bishops, the Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan 
Detroit, and local leaders of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America all opposed 
Proposal 2.67 The United Church of Christ sent a mailing to all its churches urging a “no” 
vote. The Presbytery of Detroit approved a resolution against Proposal 2 and sent a letter 
to all its churches urging a “no” vote and volunteering toward that aim.68 
Although certain religious leaders didn’t publicly oppose Proposal 2, their silence, rather 
than vocal support, was helpful to the amendment’s opposition. According to some 
estimates, approximately 20 percent of Catholic churches did not show Cardinal Maida’s 
video supporting Proposal 2.69 Similarly, a number of pastors in the black community 
failed to voice support for the amendment. As part of its outreach, Concerned Clergy 
of Western Michigan worked to gain support among religious leaders for defeating the 
amendment, and when some of those attempts were unsuccessful, they urged silence.70
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Post-election developments
It took only two days after the November 2, 2004 election for the worst-case fears of 
Proposal 2’s opponents to be realized. As early as November 4, 2004, backers of the 
constitutional amendment said they planned to review the benefit policies of all public 
employees. The Lansing State Journal quoted Gary Glenn, one of the authors of Proposal 2 
and president of the American Family Association of Michigan, as saying that any employ-
ers found to be violating the new constitutional amendment would be turned over to the 
state’s attorney general.71 
Litigation over the new amendment began with a state representative requesting Michigan 
Attorney General Michael Cox for a formal advisory opinion on whether providing 
benefits to the domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees violated the newly passed 
amendment. Cox, in a ruling that effectively carried the weight of law, found that such 
benefits were in conflict with the amendment.72 
But then a state trial court ruled that Proposal 2 did not prohibit public employers from 
providing domestic partnership benefits.73 Next, the Michigan Court of Appeals in 
February 2007 reversed that decision and ruled that the provision of domestic partner 
benefits to same-sex couples was unconstitutional.74 In May 2008, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in National Pride at Work Inc. v. Granholm affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision 
and ruled that the provision of health insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners 
was unconstitutional.75
The decision had significant, real-life consequences. At least 375 men and women who 
were Michigan public employees were in danger of losing health insurance benefits, 
according to the Associated Press.76 The decision also had economic consequences. 
Officials at Michigan’s public universities voiced concern that prohibiting same-sex ben-
efits would make it difficult to attract and retain talented faculty.77 Despite assurances of 
Proposal 2 supporters that the amendment would not affect civil unions, the truth is that 
Proposal 2 has very much affected civil unions by taking away health insurance and other 
benefits that had once been legal.
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Lessons learned
There are a number of lessons that progressive advocates and faith communities can learn 
from the 2004 marriage equality campaign in Michigan. These lessons can provide helpful 
guidance in terms of strategy, messaging, outreach, and organizing concerning future 
LGBT struggles. 
First, it is important for LGBT advocates and progressive faith leaders to work together, 
even before a ballot initiative campaign begins. It is far easier to plug into existing alliances 
than create them from scratch when a campaign is starting. Having an infrastructure in 
place is extremely valuable—it saves time, broadens outreach, and provides insider advo-
cates within faith communities. 
In fact, such relationships can be extremely valuable in preventing antimarriage equality 
efforts from qualifying for the ballot in the first place. Along with early financial support, 
a strong network of advocates and community leaders can research legal strategies and 
devise communications efforts—such as “decline-to-sign” campaigns—in order to head 
off a ballot initiative campaign. 
In Michigan, for example, conservative faith groups worked actively to get signatures on 
the ballot, while progressive faith groups were less active in efforts to prevent the amend-
ment from getting on the ballot.
Second, it is important to embed faith voices and messages within LGBT campaigns 
because they can break the antigay religious monopoly that claims to be the sole voice of 
morality on these issues. Faith language also broadens the values debate so that LGBT 
issues are not framed in terms of “moral values versus secular rights.” 
Instead, religious values are on the side of LGBT advocates as well. The importance of 
a campaign staying on message must be balanced with the great worth of voices from 
various faith communities highlighting the moral and social justice aspect of marriage 
equality. A related lesson is that when antigay religious communities use biblical texts 
and teachings to argue their case, LGBT advocates should have their own religious mes-
sages to counter opponents’ claims. 
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In Michigan, supporters of Proposal 2 referenced the “sacred understanding of marriage” 
and “the word of God.” These references were not countered by opponents. In putting 
forth religious messages, each faith community should speak out of its own tradition to its 
community using its messengers, rather than “one-size-fits-all” themes and speakers. 
Third, advocates should not write off certain religious communities as impossible to 
win or overlook any “unlikely” allies, be it the Catholic Church, the Mormon Church, or 
African-American churches. While some communities may have official pronouncements 
against same-sex marriage and campaign against it, almost always there are members 
within that community who by conscience have different views. In Michigan, Bishop 
Thomas Gumbleton and lifelong Catholic Anthony Kosnik are examples of outspoken 
opponents of Proposal 2, despite the Catholic Church’s official stance and official actions 
toward its passage. 
These faith members can become effective public allies because they prove that there are 
LGBT supporters within more conservative churches. They can help change the minds of 
fellow members by showing religious support for marriage equality. Related to that, even 
though some religious communities will never publicly endorse marriage equality, it is 
still a victory when these communities are silent rather than vocally oppositional. It is also 
important to note that some communities will put into effect “offline” strategies to create 
an undercurrent of support for marriage equality, even though they do not go public or on 
record as having done so.
Fourth, LGBT faith advocates and supporters must work within their denominations 
for full support of LGBT rights, including marriage equality and same-sex adoption. 
Denominations are national organizations with funding sources, communications arms, 
and a host of services that can be used in campaigns. It is far easier to work with a denomi-
nation than go to individual churches seeking support. 
At the moment, the opponents of marriage equality enjoy the support of the Catholic 
Church, the Mormon Church, and many others, while marriage equality supporters have 
fewer denominational allies. The impact that the Catholic Church had on ensuring the 
passage of Proposal 2 in Michigan shows the importance of denominational support.
 
Fifth, the message of LGBT rights should be framed in a mainstream way so that all citi-
zens feel connected to the issue. In addition, non-LGBT organizations, such as civil and 
human rights and faith groups, should be sought as campaign allies. For faith communi-
ties, it’s important to talk about LGBT rights and marriage equality in moral and religious 
terms, rather than shying away from that language. Campaigns for marriage equality also 
need to educate the general public about the difference between civil marriage—which 
confers certain legal rights and responsibilities on couples—and religious ceremonies, 
which are not affected by laws allowing same-sex marriage.
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Sixth, it is important to have a robust on-the-ground organization and an effective 
media campaign, especially in larger states where much of the battle is fought over the 
airwaves. And advocates should gear up for intense opposition at the end of a campaign. 
In Michigan, churchgoers were hit with a barrage of anti-same-sex marriage videos, flyers, 
and sermons the Sunday before going to the polls. It is also important to balance the goals of 
a campaign—to win the vote—with the goals of a movement, which are more long term. In 
addition, financial support is essential in order to run an effective, professional campaign.
Seventh, it is crucial to quickly rebut inaccurate arguments and misleading statements 
from antiequality forces. In Michigan, Proposal 2 supporters denied that the vague word-
ing of their proposal would take away existing legal benefits from partners in civil unions 
and their families, despite serious concerns to the contrary. They convinced voters that their 
argument was right—but it was not, and benefits that had once been legal, such as health 
insurance for children, were revoked. Instances where this “bait and switch” tactic has been 
used should be highlighted in future campaigns that deploy similar deceptive practices.
Finally, LGBT faith advocates should learn from and find strength in the current atmo-
sphere in America surrounding marriage equality. From the recent court decision in 
Iowa to the historic legislation in Vermont, faithful individuals have been active in advanc-
ing marriage equality. From these cases, just like from Michigan, lessons can be derived. 
Similarly, one can see an attitudinal shift in the public.78 Certainly, Michigan in 2004 is 
not the same as Michigan in 2009. Individuals who worked to oppose Proposal 2, LGBT 
faith advocates, professional campaigners, and others have expressed confidence that a 
Michigan battle today over marriage equality would be different. While the past cannot 
be rewritten, hope can grow from these struggles as our nation moves closer to its prom-
ise of justice and equality for all.
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